This research establishs a twin channel closed-loop provide chain (CLSC) mannequin below a authorities–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel producer, a retailer, and the federal government. We take into account a Stackelberg sport between the producer and the retailer, and the federal government rewards or punishes producers on the idea of the gathering fee of used merchandise. This paper analyzes the affect of presidency RPM on the optimum choices, the connection between the 2 gross sales channels, and the overall social welfare of the provision chain system. We discover that the federal government RPM can enhance the steadiness of the dual-channel provide chain and the gathering fee of the used merchandise. Furthermore, we’re the primary to offer a way of deriving the optimum authorities RPM by means of a numerical instance.
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